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NOTE
RESOLVING THE MODERN DAY ESAU PROBLEM
AMONGST STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT
RECIPIENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1990, a New York City subway train hit Raymond White.' As a
result of the accident, White lost his leg.2 White, who was homeless,
brought a civil suit against New York City and won.3 New York City
rewarded White with a structured settlement agreement 4 that guaranteed
that White would be financially set for the rest of his life.5 The
agreement stipulated that the defendant would pay the victim monthly
installments of $1100.6 The agreement also assured White a three
percent increase for annual living expenses. 7
Unfortunately in 1996, White fell prey to the tactics of a factoring
company. 8 A factoring company is a company that specializes in the
buying of structured settlements in exchange for quick cash at a steep
price. 9 White made the decision to sell his guaranteed payment stream to
a factoring company for a low cash value. 10 After six factoring
transactions, White sold off fifteen years of guaranteed future
payments." He traded in a total of $198,000 in tax-free future income
for $54,000 in immediate taxable cash.' 2 White used the cash to purchase
1. Philip H. Corboy, Structuredfor a Reason, A.B.A. J., June 2000, at 116, 116; Margaret
Mannix, Settling for Less: Should Accident Victims Sell Their Monthly Payouts?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 25, 1999, at 62, 64.
2. Corboy, supranote 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at 64.
3. Corboy, supranote 1, at 116; Mannix, supranote 1, at 64.
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1497 (9th ed. 2009) ("A settlement in which the defendant
agrees to pay periodic sums to the plaintiff for a specified time."); Corboy, supra note 1, at 116.
5. See Corboy, supranote 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at 64.
6. Corboy, supranote 1, at 116; Mannix, supranote 1, at 64.
7. Corboy, supranote 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at 64.
8. Corboy, supranote 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at 63-64.
9. Corboy, supranote 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at 62.
10. Corboy, supranote 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at64.
11. Corboy, supranote 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at64.
12. See Corboy, supranote 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at 64.
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a car and place a down payment on a house in Florida.1 3 Later that year,
White fell behind in his car and house payments.1 4 Soon after, White's
car was repossessed and the bank foreclosed on his home. 5 As a result,
White, now handicapped,
had to turn to public assistance in order to
16
make ends meet.
Similarly, in 2007, Charlotte Whitney, the beneficiary of a
structured settlement with a lifetime guaranteed monthly income to be
paid out over sixty-six years, sought to sell her monthly payments to a
factoring company. 17 The court approved the transfer and Whitney sold
two of her future payments totaling $60,000 for $29,000.18 In her
petition for the transfer, she alleged that she needed the cash to buy an
apartment, pay off her bills, purchase furniture, and make necessary
repairs to her automobile.' 9 Less than one year later, Whitney reappeared before the court to request the transfer of future payments
amounting to $132,000 due to her from January 2009 through August
2017, in exchange for $48,404 in immediate cash. 20 This time she
alleged that she needed the cash to move to North Carolina to be closer
to her family. 2' The court approved the second transfer.22 Subsequently,
on or about September 27, 2009, Whitney made a third request to sell
her monthly future payments due to her from 2012 through 2022.23 The
factoring company paid her a lump sum of $15,001.53 in exchange for
$60,000.24 Whitney indicated in her application that she would use the
money to pay medical bills, pre-pay her rent, and buy furniture to
accommodate her nephew, who planned to live with her.25 Although the
2007, 2008, and 2009 applications had the same address and revealed
that Whitney had not used the cash to move to North Carolina, as
indicated in her second transfer application, the court approved the
transfer. 26 Despite evidence that Whitney would not use the lump-sum
payments she received from the factoring transactions in the manner
13. Corboy, supra note 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at 64.
14. See Corboy, supra note 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at 64.
15. Corboy, supra note 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at 64.
16. Mannix, supra note 1, at 64.
17. See Whitney v. LM Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3375/2011,2011 WL 2654028, at *2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 24,2011).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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indicated in her petitions, the court allowed Whitney to sell a significant
portion of her guaranteed lifetime monthly payments within three
years.27
For the past three decades, structured settlements have provided tort
victims and their families with long-term financial security,28 because
tort victims are typically unaccustomed to handling large sums of
money.29 Statistics indicate that approximately thirty percent of
settlements paid in a lump sum are exhausted within two months, and
ninety percent are depleted within five years. 30 As a result, structured
settlements were specifically designed to solve the recipient's problem
of premature dissipation of lump-sum settlement payments.31
Basically, a structured settlement converts a lump-sum settlement
award into a series of periodic payments, typically over the course of the
victim's lifetime.32 For that reason, the structured settlement recipient's
financial circumstance "can best be described as financial peace of
mind., 33 For example, this "financial peace of mind" may come in the
form of a lifetime of guaranteed income for accident victims who can no
longer provide for themselves as a result of a serious injury.34 Hence, it
comes as no surprise that Congress endorses the use of structured
settlements through its assurance that all monies set aside for the
structured settlement are exempt from taxation.35

27. Id. at *2, *5-6.
28. Laura J. Koenig, Note, Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics? Structured Settlements,
Factoring,and the FederalGovernment, 82 IND. L.J. 809, 823 (2007). See also Daniel W. Hindert
& Craig H. Ulman, Transfers of Structured Settlement Payment Rights: What Judges Should Know
About Structured Settlement Protection Acts, JUDGES' J., Spring 2005, at 18, 19. The tort victim's
cause of action typically arises out of a claim for physical injuries, sickness, or workers'
compensation. Id
29. See Hindert & Ulman, supra note 28, at 19; T.V. Mangelsdorf, Structured Settlements in
Review: The Fundamental Concept, 4 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 559, 560 (1981). Professor T.V.
Mangelsdorf states:
Whether the settlement annuity is used to protect a person unschooled in financial
matters, who would be inept at managing the large sum of money which a non-structured
settlement would produce, or it is used to provide for the well being and education of a
child left without a provider, its use is frequently appropriate.
Id. See also Leo Andrada, Note, Structured Settlements: The Assignability Problem, 9 S.CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 465, 468 (2000).
30. Andrada, supra note 29, at 468.
31. See Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring? The Market in Tort Claims Has
Arrived, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 859, 865; Andrada, supra note 29, at 468.
32. James E. Ciecka, A Comparison of Lump-Sum and Structured Settlements, in 27 THE
TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 450, 450-51 (John J. Kennelly ed., 1983); Andrada, supra note 29, at 467.
33. Mangelsdorf, supra note 29, at 561.
34. See id.
35. See Hindert & Ulman, supra note 28, at 19. The tax exemption essentially creates a
favorable interest rate for the structured settlement recipient. Andrada, supranote 29, at 469.
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However, by purchasing structured settlements from tort victims,
factoring companies thwart Congress's intention of preventing the
victims from prematurely dissipating their awards.36 Again, factoring
companies specialize in transforming guaranteed future payments
received through structured settlements into quick cash at a steeply
discounted rate.37 As a result, the factoring companies have successfully
created a largely unregulated and thus profitable market. 38 The factoring
transactions are very lucrative because they sometimes charge discount
rates as high as seventy-two percent on relatively low risk investments.39
However, if these rates were applied to credit cards and loans, a court
would surely deem the rates "usurious. 40
The factoring companies' practices undermine the public policy of
protecting tort victims and undo the benefits provided by the legal
development of structured settlements .4a For the financially
unsophisticated, the factoring companies' practices can be deceiving.42
They do not understand that structured settlement agreements are
tailored specifically to provide for their long-term needs, including loss
of income, future medical expenses, education, and housing.43 For those
like White and Whitney, the thought of immediate cash, rather than
having to wait for future income, seems like a blessing. 44 In reality, these
transactions can be likened to a "modem-day Esau trading his
inheritance for a bowl of soup. ''41 Similarly, the financially
unsophisticated consumer is actually selling his lifetime sustenance for a
few quick dollars.46 The unfortunate result is a surge in the number of
recipients demanding governmental assistance.47

36. Mannix, supranote 1, at 62.
37. Id. The discount rate is comparable to an interest rate, paid by the settlement recipient,
which reflects the capital costs calculated by the factoring company. Scales, supra note 31, at 899.
38. See Corboy, supranote 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at 62.
39. See Corboy, supranote 1, at 116.
40. See Corboy, supra note 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at 62 (indicating that federal and
state legislators agree that the interest rates factoring companies charge are "usurious").
41. See Mannix, supra note 1, at 62.
42. See, e.g., id. at 65 (discussing Christopher Hicks, an Oklahoma man who fell prey to
factoring transactions, sold his entire structured settlement for quick cash and claimed that factoring
companies "make you think you are doing the right thing in the long run ... but you are really
messing up your life").
43. See, e.g., Koenig, supranote 28, at 823; Andrada, supra note 29, at 468-69.
44. See supraPart 1.
45. Mannix, supra note 1, at 62. Esau is an individual who sold his inheritance to his brother
Jacob in exchange for red lentil soup. Genesis 25:29-34.
46. Mannix, supra note 1, at 62.
47. See, e.g., id. at 64 (explaining that White had to turn to public assistance in order to
support himself).
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Nearly every state has adopted some sort of structured settlement
protection act requiring judicial approval in order to effectuate the
factoring transaction. 48 Although New York State has adopted the
Structured Settlement Protection Act (the "N.Y. SSPA"),49 the statute
does little to protect structured settlement recipients from factoring
companies.50 Scant interest has been devoted to actually creating a
concrete standard for judges to follow. 5 ' Additionally, the N.Y.
Legislature (the "Legislature") has not created any parameters as to
whether factoring transactions are in fact reasonable.52 Some critics have
suggested that the factoring industry should be banned. 53 However, this
proposal is too extreme. Factoring transactions should not be banned
because they provide liquidity to those in dire situations.5 Rather, in
response to the issues surrounding the N.Y. SSPA, this Note proposes
practical methods to resolving the problems caused by the factoring
industry.
Part II of this Note briefly describes the history of structured
settlements. Next, Part III explains the rise of the factoring industry and
the contemporary problems created by this enterprise. Part IV then
introduces the federal and state efforts that have been made to better
protect structured settlement recipients from the perils of factoring
transactions. Part IV also focuses specifically on New York State
legislative initiatives made thus far and points out the problematic
aspects of the N.Y. SSPA. Part V then concludes with practical solutions
that New York State should adopt in order to better effectuate the N.Y.
SSPA. Part V also suggests alternatives to factoring transactions and
what structured settlement recipients can do to better safeguard their
financial security.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE PERFECT SOLUTION: STRUCTURED
SETTLEMENTS

Prior to the emergence of structured settlements, tort victims were
only awarded on a lump-sum basis. Section A details the birth of
48. Hindert & Ulman, supra note 28, at 20.
49. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1701 to 5-1709 (McKinney 2010).
50. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 17-27.
51. See In re J.G. Wentworth Originations, L.L.C., No. 21636 2011, 2011 WL 6224568, at *4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 2011).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Senator Warns on Selling StructuredSettlement Payments, NAT'L STRUCTURED
SETTLEMENTS TRADE

ASS'N, http://www.nssta.com/news/senator-warns-selling-structured-settle

ment-payments (last visited Apr. 20, 2012).
54. See Mannix, supra note 1, at 62.
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structured settlements. Section B then explains how to create a structured
settlement. Lastly, Section C explains why structured settlements are
preferred over lump-sum payments.
A.

Settlements. The PreferredAlternative to the Trial Ordeal

Settlements are common and a reality of litigation today." Studies
indicate that most civil cases never make it to trial.56 In fact, less than six
percent of cases actually survive the trial ordeal. 7 Moreover, both
scholars and judges regard public trials as a wasteful exercise. 8 Trials
are time-consuming and often require large monetary commitments from
both the plaintiff and defendant. 59
Traditionally, tort settlements "have been awarded on a lump-sum
basis. '' 60 In the past, plaintiffs often exhibited serious problems with the
handling of large sums of money. 61 Approximately thirty percent of
structured settlements paid in lump sums were squandered within two
months, and ninety percent were exhausted within five years.62
Fortunately, in the late 1960s, the concept of structured settlements was
introduced.63 Prior to the arrival of structured settlements, plaintiffs had

55. EVALUATING AND SETTLING PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 32 (George M. Gold ed., 1991);
Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information About Settlement
in an Age of Confidentiality,48 UCLA L. REv. 663, 666 (2001) (explaining that approximately sixty
percent of all cases settle).
56. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": JudicialPromotionand Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1344 (1994). Judges actively promote the use of settlement and
often intervene to assure that the dispute is resolved before the jury trial. Id at 1342, 1344.
57. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and FederalCourts: A Statistical
Portrait,19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 442 (1996) (explaining that the completed state trial rate is
2.9%, and the completed federal rate, excluding asbestos cases, is five percent). Quality settlements
result in party satisfaction, cost savings, and judicial efficiency. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 56, at
1350-51. These benefits make it highly probable that the number of disputes resulting in settlement
will remain high. See id.
at 1387.
58. See Scales, supra note 31, at 894. Trials can be analogized to surgeries: "painful last
resorts ... likely to place the patient in a weakened condition ... and almost certain to leave lasting
scars." David Luban, Essay, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
2621 (1995). Following this metaphor, settlements are better than surgery, because if successful they
provide "noninvasive alternate therapy." Id.
59. JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 175 (1988) ("[Nlegative features of the
American adjudicative process ...[include] calamitous delay in getting to trial, the procedural
complexity and chicanery open to litigants, and the uncertainty of legal outcome implicit in the jury
system."); Luban, supranote 58, at 2621.
60. Scales, supranote 31, at 862.
61. Andrada, supranote 29, at 468.
62. Id.
63. Jeremy Babener, StructuredSettlements and Single-Claimant QualifiedSettlement Funds:
Regulating in Accordance with StructuredSettlement History, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 1,
16 (2010); Richard B. Risk, Jr., A Case for the Urgent Need to Clarify Tax Treatment of a Qualified

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol40/iss2/9

6

Marcellus: Resolving the Modern Day Esau Problem Amongst Structured Settleme

2011]

THE MODERN DAY ESA U PROBLEM

no other option than to accept a lump sum as a method of
compensation. 64 The structured settlement, in comparison to the lumpsum method, provides victims with periodic payments over a period of
time that generally cannot be spent until the payments are made to the
65
plaintiff.
B. How to Create a StructuredSettlement
Structured settlements are relatively simply to create.66 Typically,
the plaintiff and defendant agree to a structured settlement before the
judge gets deeply involved in the case. 6' A structured settlement can be
understood as a compensation vehicle comprised of three main parts: (1)
an initial amount paid in a lump sum at the time that the parties agree to
a settlement; (2) future periodic payments; and (3) annuities. 6' The first
component, which consists of cash paid at the time of settlement, usually
covers outstanding expenses that may be related to the injury 69 Second,
Settlement Fund Created for a Single Claimant, 23 VA. TAx REv. 639, 641-42 (2004); see also
Brian Brown & Lisa Chalidze, Structured Settlements: An Overview, VT. B.J. & L. DIG., Feb. 1996,
at 14, 14 (explaining that the use of structured settlements to make periodic payments to plaintiffs
increased in the 1960s following the large litigation triggered by thalidomide, a drug linked with
causing birth defects amongst infants).
64. Andrada, supra note 29, at 467. Today, plaintiffs have the option of selecting a lump sum
or a structured settlement award. Ciecka, supra note 32, at 450.
65. Andrada, supra note 29, at 468. See also Ciecka, supra note 32, at 450 ("Although part of
a structured settlement may involve an immediate cash payout, the nature of such a settlement is that
the plaintiff will receive periodic payments in the future."); Hindert & Ulman, supra note 28, at 19.
66. See Anthony Riccardi & Thomas Ireland, A Primer on Annuity Contracts, Structured
Settlements, and Periodic-Payment Judgments, J. LEGAL ECON., Winter 2002-2003, at 1, 7
(explaining how parties properly establish a structured settlement). In order to qualify as a structured
settlement, the arrangement must be established by:
(A) (i) suit or arrangement for the periodic payment of damages... or
(ii) agreement for the periodic payment of compensation under any workers'
compensation law.., and
(B).. . [where] periodic payments are(i) of the character described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 130(c)(2),
and
(ii) payable by a person who is a party to the suit or agreement or to the workers'
compensation claim or by a person who has assumed the liability for such periodic
payments under a qualified assignment in accordance with section 130.
I.R.C. § 5891(c)(1) (2006). The referenced Section, 130(c)(2), provides that "if--(A) such periodic
payments are fixed and determinable as to amount and time of payment, (B) such periodic payments
cannot be accelerated, deferred, increased, or decreased by the recipient of such payments." Id.
§ 130(c)(2)(A)-(B).
67. Babener, supra note 63, at 9.
68.

JAMES R. ECK & JEFFREY L. UNGERER, STRUCTURING SETTLEMENTS 29 (1987).

69. Id.These outstanding expenses can include "medical expenses due the hospital, physician,
pharmacy, technician, and other health care providers." Id. Additionally, there can be "expenses for
travel by family members to and from the place of confinement of the injured party, meals, lodging,
clothing, telephone expenses, and like costs not covered by any hospital or major medical insurance
policy." Id.
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the calculation for future periodic payments may include compensation
for "[f]uture [m]edical and [s]urgical [e]xpenses," "[f]uture
[e]nvironmental [m]odifications and [m]edical [e]quipment," an
"[e]ducation [f]und," or any other needs that are likely to arise. 70 The
third part, an annuity, is the means used to pay out the second part, the
future payments. 71 An annuity is defined as a stream of fixed payments
over a specified period of time.72 Therefore, the defendant purchases a
single-premium annuity contract from a life insurance company in order
to fund the plaintiff's future payments.73 Through the annuity contract, a
stream of future payments is produced in accordance with the schedule
set out in the settlement agreement.74 The annuity contract ensures that
the future periodic payments are made to the plaintiff on schedule. 75 The
result is a "structured" method of guaranteed income over the victim's
lifetime, as opposed to lump-sum compensation in the form of cash.76
C. StructuredSettlements:
Not Just the PopularChoice, but the Right Choice
There are many reasons as to why a plaintiff should consider using
a structured settlement over a lump-sum compensation award.77 One of
the most compelling reasons is that structured settlements provide
spendthrift protection.7 8 Plaintiffs are often unable to properly manage
large sums of money themselves. 79 Thus, the periodic payments prevent
70. Id. at 31-32.
71. See Hindert & Ulman, supranote 28, at 19; Riccardi & Ireland, supra note 66, at 7.
72. Ciecka, supra note 32, at 452 ("A structured settlement can entail fixed periodic payments
or payments that increase at a fixed percentage per year."). See also Mangelsdorf, supra note 29, at
560 (remarking that structured settlements are flexible in that for a family with children, the
settlement agreement can stipulate that payments should increase to meet the children's future
educational needs and decrease upon reaching adulthood). The fixed payments may be made on a
monthly or annual basis. ECK & UNGERER, supra note 68, at 29.
73. Ciecka, supra note 32, at 450 ("In a structured settlement, the defendant makes a lumpsum payout to an insurance company which, in turn, guarantees that periodic payments will be made
to the plaintiff."); Hindert & Ulman, supra note 28, at 19; Mangelsdorf, supra note 29, at 561;
Riccardi & Ireland, supranote 66, at 7; Koenig, supra note 28, at 812.
74. Riccardi & Ireland, supranote 66, at 7.
75. See id.
76. Scales, supra note 31, at 865 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. See Andrada, supranote 29, at 468.
78. See ECK & UNGERER, supra note 68, at 42.
79. Scales, supra note 31, at 869; Andrada, supra note 29, at 468. Plaintiffs are typically
unable to handle large sums of money and are left with no source of income once the funds run out.
Mangelsdorf, supra note 29, at 560. Many experienced attorneys lamented that plaintiffs typically
dissolve their settlement awards rather quickly because they cannot say "no" to friends and relatives
or sometimes fail to make wise investments. Randee Karen Carson & David J. Tong, Commentary,
Structured Settlements: Customized Compensation for PersonalInjury Plaintiffs, 13 STETSON L.
REv. 309, 313 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the plaintiff from "[s]quandering" his or her damage award.8 ° In the
event that the plaintiff falls prey to bad judgment, delinquent habits, bad
advice, or bad luck, the structured settlement's spendthrift measures,
mainly spreading the payments over time, protect the plaintiff.81
Additionally, premature dissipation can pose a serious problem
when the plaintiff is relying on his or her future income as compensation
for lost wages, or future medical or living expenses. 82 When a plaintiff
with a diminished earnings capacity exhausts a settlement award too
quickly, which is typically the case when the plaintiff receives a lumpsum award, the plaintiff may be unable to afford his or her future
medical and living expenses. 83 Consequently, the plaintiff may become a
burden to society because he or she no longer possesses the ability to
support him- or herself financially. 84 Once the plaintiff squanders the
lump-sum cash payment, he or she typically looks to public assistance as
a source of income.85 Without a doubt, the victims are "revictimized. 8 6
The plaintiff is typically still unable to provide for him- or herself and
thus is back in the very predicament that the structured settlement
agreement sought to prevent. 87
A second reason that structured settlements are the "right choice" is
because they are protected from bankruptcy petitions. 8 Bankruptcy
courts have held that the public policy supporting structured settlements
mandates that the courts protect structured settlement recipients from
creditors.89 In the event that the victim defaults on his or her debt and
files for bankruptcy, the future payments are immune from creditor
claims. 90
Third, structured settlements benefit both the "unsophisticated" and
"sophisticated investor." 91 For instance, the more experienced investor
80. See Scales, supra note 31, at 869 (noting that commentators unanimously agree that the
plaintiffs are known for mismanaging large sums of money); see also ECK & UNGERER, supra note
68, at 42.
81. Richard B. Risk, Jr., Comment, Structured Settlements: The Ongoing Evolution from a
LiabilityInsurer's Ploy to an Injury Victim's Boon, 36 TULSA L.J. 865, 867 (2001).
82. Andrada, supranote 29, at 468-69.
83. Id.; Carson & Tong, supranote 79, at 312-13.
84. Carson & Tong, supra note 79, at 313.
85. Id. (rationalizing that squandering the lump sum may lead tort victims to become
dependent on public assistance programs such as welfare or Medicaid).
86. Corboy, supranote 1, at 116.
87. Id.; see Carson & Tong, supranote 79, at 313.
88. Risk, supra note 81, at 867.
89. At least two federal bankruptcy courts ruled that the debtors' structured settlement
payments are beyond creditors' reach. Id.; see, e.g., In re Belue, 238 BR. 218, 223 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1999); In re Alexander, 227 B.R. 658, 661 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
90. Risk, supra note 81, at 867.
91. Id. at 868.
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can take advantage of "dollar cost averaging" as an investment strategy
to beat market returns.9 2 In the event that an experienced investor makes
a poor investment decision with one or more of his or her payments, the
investor can use future payments as a financial cushion. 93 Meanwhile,
under a lump-sum payment, one poor financial decision could potentially
force even an experienced investor to turn to the federal government for
assistance.94
Arguably, since work-related injuries are typically rewarded the
largest amount of money, the majority of structured settlement recipients
are unsophisticated investors.95 For the inexperienced investor, a
structured settlement requires little to no managerial effort. 96 On the
other hand, if the investor were to receive a lump-sum payment, he or
she would have to make critical decisions in order to make the lump sum
last a lifetime.97 Fortunately, the structured settlement method of
spreading the payments relieves the burden imposed by the financial
decision making process. 98 Thus, the owner of a structured settlement,
unlike a typical investor, does not have to worry about market
fluctuations or bad investments.99 The recipient's future income stream
is guaranteed, regardless of market performance.' 0 0
The final reason that structured settlements are preferred over lumpsum payments is due to congressional efforts to safeguard the payees'
rights to compensation.' 0 1 Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code
("I.R.C.") to allow for federal tax exemption of all periodic damage
1 2
payments and accrued interest on structured settlement payments. 0
92. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This concept requires the investor to invest his or
her tax-free periodic payments in a given security at regular intervals rather than second-guessing
what might occur in the market, essentially attempting to beat the market. See id.
93. See id. at 867.
94. See Carson & Tong, supra note 79, at 313.
95. See Scales, supra note 31, at 869 (noting that in work-related claims, the victim is
typically the average worker). Since corporate financial officers, who would likely be more
sophisticated investors, spend most of their time behind a desk or in a boardroom, it is unlikely that
they will be structured settlement recipients. See id. The recipient may also be a minor, who is likely
an unsophisticated investor as well. Andrada, supra note 29, at 469.
96. Risk, supra note 81, at 866. The unsophisticated investor does not have to worry about the
investment portfolio because the annuity or insurance company manages the investments. ECK &
UNGERER, supra note 68, at 42; Ciecka, supra note 32, at 450.
97. Ciecka, supra note 32, at 450; Risk, supra note 81, at 868; see ECK & UNGERER, supra
note 68, at 42 (clarifying that for larger investments, an investor must be able to diversify his or her
portfolio).
98. See Risk, supranote 81, at 868.
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. See Riccardi & Ireland, supra note 66, at 7-8; infra Part 1V.B.
102. See Hindert & Ulman, supra note 28, at 19; Riccardi & Ireland, supra note 66, at 7-8;
Andrada, supra note 29, at 470. See also Risk, supra note 81, at 872 (stating that the tax exclusion
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Further, Congress endorses the use of structured settlements over lumpsum payments by taxing the investment gains made on lump-sum
03
awards. 1
On the other hand, proponents of lump-sum awards argue that a
major disadvantage of structured settlements is the "inflexibility" of the
awards, such that the recipients are barred from having unlimited access
to their funds. 1°4 However, it is the inflexibility behind the fixed
payments that affords the plaintiff with future economic protection. 105
Additionally, a few critics question the statistic that ninety percent of
lump-sum settlements are depleted within five years. 106 Although some
critics question this statistic because of the broad scope of the study, the
study is at least indicative of the structured settlement recipient's
"propensity" to spend lump-sum awards. 10 7 The main reason for this
result is the "apparent inability" of many plaintiffs to make prudent
investments with the large awards. 0 8 The personal injury tort victims are

by Congress is an incentive to the award recipient to choose a structured settlement rather than a
lump sum, which if dissipated, can cause the recipient to become an outcast in society).
103. See Hindert & Ulman, supra note 28, at 19; Andrada, supra note 29, at 470. Andrada
states:
Generally speaking, personal injury settlement awards are not taxed, regardless of
whether they are received as a lump sum or as payments over time. On the other hand,
investment gains are generally taxed, even if those gains are made with money received
in a personal injury settlement. Thus, with a lump sum award, the plaintiff pays no taxes
for receiving the award but will usually begin to pay taxes on the award once it is
received. For example, a plaintiff may decide upon receiving an award to invest in the
stock market, purchase a mutual fund, or simply deposit the money in the bank. In each
of these cases, the plaintiff will generally pay federal income tax on any profits or
interest. The structured settlement, on the other hand, allows those portions of the award
that have not yet been disbursed to accrue interest which is exempt from the federal
income tax.
Andrada, supra note 29, at 470 (footnotes omitted).
104. See Risk, supra note 81, at 868; Press Release, J.G. Wentworth, The #1 Reason
Consumers Sell Their Structured Settlements Is to Pay Bills, According to Survey by J.G.
Wentworth (Nov. 4, 2008), availableat http://www jgwentworth.com/about/news/press/detail.aspx?
i=46. Proponents of the lump-sum method argue that with unlimited access to the award, a plaintiff
could possibly beat the annuity's guaranteed interest rate by investing in the right mix of securities.
Risk, supra note 81, at 868. However, this is very difficult because one bad investment could
deplete a plaintiff's entire award. ECK & UNGERER, supra note 68, at 41. There is no guarantee that
a plaintiff can invest in the market and do better than the guaranteed income stream provided by the
annuity. See id.
105. See ECK & UNGERER, supra note 68, at 41 (emphasizing the high risk associated with
investing in securities); Risk, supranote 81, at 868 ("But, for those payees ... who might otherwise
be inclined to dissipate a large settlement, inflexibility also means indestructibility.").
106. Scales, supra note 31, at 870-71; Jeremy Babener, Note, Justifying the Structured
Settlement Tax Subsidy: The Use of Lump Sum Settlement Monies, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 127, 13738 (2009).
107. Carson & Tong, supranote 79, at 312.
108. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 9

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:517

typically in more need of protection because the injury may have left
them physically or mentally disabled and unable to make wise monetary
decisions with the lump-sum award.109 Thus, the structured settlement is
a valuable tool for tort victims." 0
III.

THE FACTORING INDUSTRY: THE RISE OF A PREDATORY INDUSTRY

Factoring industries made their debut appearance in the 1990s.
Section A follows their career path from their early beginnings of buying
lottery winnings to ultimately making it big in the structured settlement
payment market. Section B demystifies the factoring transaction by
explaining how they work. Finally, Section C details what issues are
created when structured settlement payees sell their future payments to
factoring companies.
A.

The Rise of the FactoringIndustry andthe Demise of the Economic
ProtectionProvidedby StructuredSettlements

The 1990s introduced a private market composed of "a new breed
of aggressive hucksters," otherwise known as structured settlement
factoring companies."' Factoring companies use aggressive advertising
to persuade structured settlement recipients, or payees, to sell their future
rights to payment for a lump-sum cash payment. 1 2 These companies
acquire the payees' rights to future income in exchange for steeply
discounted cash."l 3 Essentially, the factoring company makes a large net
profit by providing the recipient with cash at a value worth much less
than the future payment.ll4
Factoring companies originally started in the lottery industry,
purchasing future payments at a discount rate from lottery winners."5
These companies soon realized that more money could be made through
the purchase of structured settlements."l 6 Currently, the largest purchaser
of structured settlements is J.G. Wentworth & Co., ("Wentworth") which
handles approximately half of all the transactions in the factoring
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Babener, supra note 63, at 31-32; Corboy, supra note 1, at 116; Hindert & Ulman, supra
note 28, at 19.
112. Babener, supra note 63, at 31-32; Hindert & Ulman, supranote 28, at 19.
113. Corboy, supra note 1, at 116; Hindert & Ulman, supranote 28, at 20.
114. Babener, supra note 63, at 32 ("By offering a cash amount to a structured settlement
recipient sufficiently below the present value of the future income stream, a factoring company can
net a profit." (footnote omitted)).
115. Risk, supra note 81, at 883.
116. See Mannix, supranote 1, at 62.
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market. 1 7 Wentworth is a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania firm that started
out as a financer to nursing homes and long-term care facilities."'
However, in 1992, Wentworth discovered that more money could be
made in the structured settlement market." 9 That year, Wentworth began
to purchase structured settlements from vehicular accident victims in
New Jersey.1 20 Since the transition into the structured settlement market
in 1992, Wentworth has participated in more than 15,000 structured
settlement transactions, totaling over $370 million. 12 ' In 2007 and 2008,
Wentworth reportedly purchased structured settlements with aggregate
payments of $728 million for each of those years. 2 2
Factoring companies like Wentworth use aggressive marketing
strategies to induce structured settlement recipients to sell their
structured settlement rights. 23 These companies produce commercials
that flood television sets and the Internet.124 For instance, Wentworth,
whose commercials are played numerous times throughout the day,
boasts that they specialize in providing structured settlement holders
with "cash now."' 2 5 However, these commercials fail to explain to the
structured settlement recipient
that what he or she is really trading is his
26
1
well-being.
or her financial
B. How FactoringTransactions Work
Factoring transactions are difficult to understand because the
financial concepts involved are complex. These concepts include: the
time value of money, present value, and discount rate. 1 7 For example, a
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 62-63.
120. Id.
121. Id.at63.
122. Babener, supranote 63, at 33.
123. Hindert & Ulman, supranote 28, at 19.
124. Between 1996 and 1998, Wentworth aired more than 90,000 thirty-second television
commercials. Vanessa O'Connell, Like It or Lump It: Thriving Industry Buys InsuranceSettlements
from Injured Plaintiffs,WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1998, at Al.
125. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Senator Warns on Selling Structured
Settlement Payments, supra note 53 (stating that television ads which offer "cash now" to an
individual receiving structured settlement payments advocate a practice that should be outlawed
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. See O'Connell, supra note 124, at Al ("Allen Reed, a lawyer for Chicago-based insurer
CNA Financial Corp., [said] the whole idea behind structured settlements is to prevent vulnerable or
unsophisticated claimants from frittering their settlements away." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
127. See Corrie Erickson, Chapter593: A Structurefor the Transfer of Structured Settlements,
41 MCGEORGE L. REv. 667, 674 (2010) (explaining that a payee must have "legal sophistication and
patience" to understand the factoring transaction); Mannix, supranote 1, at 63.
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structured settlement recipient who would like to sell a future payment
of $75,000 will not sell the payment for $75,000 because money to be
paid years from now is worth less in the present day. 128 This concept is
known as the time value of money. 29 Basically, money to be paid at a
later date is worth less today because of inflation. 130 As a result, because
of the time value of money, the factoring company will pay less today
for the recipient's future payment. 3' The factoring company uses a
complex formula, known as the present value formula, to calculate how
much the future payment is worth today. 132 The interest rate used in the
present value formula is called the discount rate. 33 The present value
date to maturity,
formula takes into account certain factors, such as the 34
the interest rate, inflation, and the time value of money.1
C. Problems Caused by the FactoringIndustry
Many legal issues surround the sale of structured settlements to
factoring companies. First, since the factoring industry is essentially
unregulated, factoring companies often charge exorbitantly high rates. 35
In fact, courts and government officials have reported that factoring36
companies have charged over seventy percent on a single transaction.
The factoring companies argue that these high rates reflect the cost of
doing business, which includes the cost of borrowing money to finance
the lump-sum payments made to payees and legal costs. 137 Moreover,

128. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO BUSINESS AND

FINANCE FUNDAMENTALS § 2.01, at 2-3 (Aspen Publishers 2d ed. 2007) (1989) ("One of the most
fundamental financial concepts is that money to be paid or received in the future is not worth as
much as money to be paid or received today."); Mannix, supra note 1, at 63.
129. HAMILTON &BOOTH, supra note 128, § 2.01,at 2-3.
130. Mannix, supranote 1, at 63.
131. See id.
132. See id. Present value is defined as "[t]he sum of money that, with compound interest,
would amount to a specified sum at a specified future date; future value discounted to its value
today." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1303-04 (9th ed. 2009).

133. See Mannix, supra note 1, at 63.
134. See id.
135. Corboy, supra note 1, at 116 (finding rates in some cases to be as high as seventy-two
percent); Hindert & Ulman, supra note 28, at 20 (claiming that factoring companies charge rates as
high as seventy percent); Vince Tilley, Damages: Regulate the Transfer of Structured Settlement
Payment Rights; Provide That No Such Transfer Shall Be Effective Unless CertainDisclosures Are
Made; Provide for a Right of Rescission with Respect to Such Transactions; Provide for
Enforcement, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 277, 278 (1999); see also O'Connell, supra note 124, at A8
(pointing to an instance where Wentworth charged a consumer twenty-one percent interest on her
structured settlement payment).
136. Corboy, supranote 1, at 116.
137. Koenig, supra note 28, at 814.
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factoring company proponents point out that the' 38high rates are
"primarilya function of competition and capital costs.'
However, the factoring companies' argument for high discount
rates cannot be substantiated. Unlike credit card companies and banks
that loan out unsecured money at much lower rates, factoring companies
charge high rates, yet receive a secure asset backed by a guaranteed
source of income. 39 Since the future payments are backed by the annuity
contract, the factoring company is guaranteed payment and thus the
future payments are essentially risk-free. 140 As a result, the high discount
rates are not justified because interest rates are associated with risk; the
higher the risk, the higher the rate. 14 ' Both federal and state legislators
agree that if factoring transactions were treated as loans, these rates
would be deemed "usurious."'' 42 Thus, if the structured settlement
find
recipient properly understood these rates, he or she would surely
43
them to be unreasonable and refuse to sell his or her payments.1
Second, when a plaintiff exhausts his or her settlement award too
quickly, numerous problems may arise. In most cases, settlement awards
are expected to pay for future medical, living, or extraordinary
expenses.' 4 For those victims with serious injuries, the transfer of future
income may be detrimental to the payee if he or she is left unemployed
and disabled as a result of the injuries. 14 As a result, where the
plaintiff's injuries are so serious that he or she can no longer work, the
' ' 46
factoring transaction may "have life-threatening consequences. 9
Further, the inflexibility, which allows the payee to spend only a portion
of his or her settlement, also means indestructibility. 47 Without the
structure that structured settlement payments provide, victims like
48 White
and Whitney are left with no security and are thus revictimized.1
Third, critics are "unequivocally antagonistic to the enterprise,"
because they argue that the factoring industry preys on vulnerable

138. Scales, supranote 31, at 930.
139. Babener, supra note 63, at 35; see, e.g., Corboy, supra note 1, at 116 (finding factoring
companies charging rates as high as seventy-two percent); James J. White, The Usury Trompe
L 'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445, 449, 467 (2000) (finding the interest rate limit for banks in Minnesota
to be no higher than eighteen percent per year).
140. See Riccardi & Ireland, supra note 66, at 7.
141. See HAMILTON & BOOm, supra note 128, § 2.06, at 2-14.
142. Corboy, supra note 1, at 116; Mannix, supra note 1, at 62.
143. Corboy, supranote 1,at 116.
144. Tilley, supra note 135, at 277.
145. Andrada, supra note 29, at 468-69.
146. Id.
147. 144 CONG. REC. 23,343 (1998); Risk, supra note 81, at 868.
148. See Corboy, supra note 1, at 116; supra Part I.
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consumers. 149 These critics also argue that if structured settlement
recipients "did not require protection and were not susceptible and
150
potentially gullible, they would have no need for such settlements.'
The victims are those who do not have the legal sophistication to
understand the true value of their future payments.' 5 ' It is a fact that
impact on Africanfactoring transactions have a disproportionate
52
Americans and low-income individuals.1
Factoring companies often charge high discount rates to payees
who are not equipped to fully understand the importance of their future
53
payments or the "onerous terms" involved in the factoring transaction. 1
For instance, in 1990, Debra Ann Hayden sold her medical malpractice
settlement to a factoring company. 5 4 Hayden sold her annuity payments
in exchange for a lump sum because at the time, she was experiencing
financial problems. ' Although $92,420.63 of the money Hayden
received was to pay her outstanding debt, she declared Chapter 13
within two years of selling her structured settlement
bankruptcy
56
award.
In contrast, Wentworth and other factoring companies argue that
since structured settlements are not flexible assets, factoring companies
are necessary to provide the recipients with liquidity. 5 7 Further,
factoring companies contend that structured settlement recipients may
need future adjustments, which the fixed monthly payments of structured
settlements fail to provide.' 5 8 Rather, these companies argue that they
provide an invaluable service: flexibility. 59 While this may be so, the
sharp discount rates that factoring companies charge do not seem to
suggest that they provide a valid service; rather, the rates suggest
exploitation.160 U.S. Senator Max Baucus lamented that the planning that
goes into "structuring" the future payments "can be unraveled in an

149. Corboy, supra note 1, at 116.
150. Id.
151. Hindert & Ulman, supra note 28, at 20. See, e.g., 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. v.
Martinez (In re 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P.), 816 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299-302 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
152. Martinez, 816 N.Y.S.2d at 298-99.
153. Hindert & Ulman, supranote 28, at 20.
154. W. United Life Assurance Co. v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 833, 834-36 (3d Cir. 1995).
155. Id. at 835-36.
156. Id. at 836.
157. Mannix, supranote 1, at 63.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See Corboy, supra note 1, at 116 (noting that the factoring companies exploit structured
settlement recipients by charging "unconscionable rates").
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instant by161 a factoring company offering quick cash at a steep
discount."'
Several state attorneys general believe that factoring companies run
counter to the public policy of protecting structured settlement
victims. 162 For instance, Joseph Goldberg, the senior deputy attorney
general for Pennsylvania, contended that "[y]ou have got to worry about
people who have a debilitating injury .... The injury is never going
away and they have no real means of income and probably no means of
employment .... If they give that monthly payment up, it could have
serious consequences."' 163 Additionally, disability groups, like The
National Spinal Cord Injury Association, have voiced similar concerns
and refuse to accept factoring companies' advertisements in their
magazines. 16' In fact, these groups warn members that they should avoid
such quick cash transactions. 65 Factoring transactions violate the very
premise that structured settlements are intended to prevent., 66 The simple
idea of taking away money from injury victims, including children, for a
67
steep price is clearly contrary to public policy.
IV.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Both state and federal legislators have sought to combat the evils of
factoring transactions. Section A explains the federal efforts thus far to
protect structured settlement recipients from the perils of factoring.
Section B goes through the federal laws that have been passed to
encourage the use of structured settlements by plaintiffs, particularly the
concept of tax exemptions of future payments. Section B, Subsection 1
begins with the origin of the concept of excluding compensatory
damages from taxable income. Subsection 2 deals with two revenue
rulings that sought to legitimize the use of structured settlements.
Subsection 3 recognizes the codification of the two revenue rulings and
the subsequent growth of the factoring industry. Next, Section C
identifies New York State legislative efforts to protect structured
settlement recipients pursuant to the N.Y. SSPA. Section D lists the
preliminary hurdles an applicant faces before he or she can entertain
receiving a lump-sum cash payment from a factoring company. Section
161. Mannix, supra note 1, at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. See id.
at 66.
163. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Corboy, supra note 1, at 116 ("One official recently suggested that structured settlements
are a scam foisted upon tort victims .... "); Mannix, supra note 1, at 62.
167. See Corboy, supra note 1, at 116.
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E explains the new role played by N.Y. courts in factoring transactions.
Finally, Section F explains the many problems surrounding the N.Y.
SSPA.
A.

FederalEfforts to ProtectStructuredSettlement Recipientsfrom
FactoringCompanies

The U.S. Department of the Treasury (the "Treasury") was one of
the first to realize that the factoring companies' abusive practice thwarts
the congressional intent of protecting structured settlement recipients.168
In doing so, the Treasury urged Congress to take immediate action for
relief against the victimization of claimants. 169 In the federal budget for
the 1999 fiscal year, a remedial measure was170proposed which intended to
reduce the number of factoring transactions.
The proposal recommended that Congress impose a federal excise
tax on the factoring transactions that involved the transfer of structured
settlement recipient rights without prior court approval. 171 On January
23, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the Victims of
Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001,172 which successfully adopted the
proposition. 173 The proposal was then codified under the I.R.C. as
Section 5891.174 Specifically, the I.R.C. imposes a forty percent federal
a payee's rights through a factoring
excise tax on any party that acquires
175
transaction without a court order.
B. FederalEfforts to Encourage the Use ofStructuredSettlements
1. The Origin of the Concept of the Exclusion of Compensatory
Damages from Taxable Income
Congressional efforts to help structured settlement payees began far
before the Treasury took note of the effects factoring companies had on

168. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 69 (1998), available at http://www.gpo

access.gov/usbudget/fy99/pdf/spec.pdf; Hindert & Ulman, supranote 28, at 20; Mannix, supranote
1, at 62.
169. See Hindert & Ulman, supra note 28, at 20-21.
170. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supranote 168, at 69.
171. Id.
172. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); IRS Implements New Tax Relieffor Victims of Terrorist
Attacks, IRS (Jan. 23, 2002), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-02-07.pdf.
173. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 § 115(a), 115 Stat. at 2436 (codified at 26

U.S.C. § 5891 (2006)).
174.

I.R.C. § 5891 (2006).

175. Id. § 5891(a)-(b).
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structured settlement claimants. 176 Starting in the 1980s, Congress
enacted a variety of tax guidelines to encourage the use of structured
settlements over lump-sum payments. 177 As a78 result, structured
settlement payments are now exempt from taxation.1
The concept that tort damages should not count towards gross
income, 179 and thus should be excluded from taxable income, can be
traced back to the back to the early 1900s. 180 The Revenue Act of 1918
(the "Revenue Act") introduced the notion that tort damages should not
be taxed. 18 1 Specifically, Section 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act excludes
from taxation all income received from damages under workmen's
compensation. 8 2 The rationale behind this concept is that Congress did
not consider the victim's damage award as a gain but merely as
compensation intended to make the victim whole again. 83 Congress
reasoned that, since the plaintiffs future payments do not come within
the meaning of "income"' 84 under the Sixteenth Amendment,"' the
176. Koenig, supra note 28, at 814.
177. Id. at 814, 816.
178. I.R.C. § 130(a) ("Any amount received for agreeing to a qualified assignment shall not be
included in gross income to the extent that such amount does not exceed the aggregate cost of any
qualified funding assets.").
179. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065 (1919) ("[T]he
term 'gross income'-(a) Includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or
compensation for personal service ....
180. Risk, supra note 81, at 870.
181. See Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. at 1065-66. Further:
[T]he term "gross income"... [d]oes not include the following items, which shall be
exempt from taxation under this title: ...[a]mounts received, through accident or health
insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries
or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on
account of such injuries or sickness ....
Id.
182. Id.
183. See Risk, supra note 81, at 870. The U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means report
accompanying the Revenue Bill of 1918 states:
Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts received through accident or
health insurance, or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal
injury or sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are
required to be included in gross income. The proposed bill provides that such amounts
shall not be included in gross income.
H.R. REP. No. 65-767, pt. 2, at 9-10 (1918). In 1927, the Board of Tax Appeals reasoned that tort
damages are intended to "make the plaintiff whole," and thus, cannot be said to constitute gain or
income. Id.at 870-71.
184. In a 1922 tax ruling the IRS affirmed the belief that the damages are not considered
income for tax purposes. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (ruling that
compensatory damages are not taxable as income because the damage award is not a gain derived
from capital, labor, or the growth of an investment); Mark J. Wolff, Sex, Race, andAge: Double
Discriminationin Torts and Taxes, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1439 (2000); Risk, supra note 81, at
870.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
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payments are not subject to federal taxation.1 86 Subsequently, Congress
codified87 tax enhancements for tort damages in Section 104(a) of the
1
I.R.C.

2. The Two Revenue Rulings that Legitimized the Use of
Structured Settlements
The favorable tax treatment of structured settlements did not occur
until 1979.188 That year, the Internal Revenue Service issued two
revenue rulings that clarified that Section 104(a)(2)' 89 applied to
structured settlements, 190 Revenue Ruling 79-220191 and Revenue Ruling
79-313.192 Both permitted periodic payments
to be excluded from
193
taxation for personal injury settlements.
Revenue Ruling 79-220 allowed a plaintiff to exclude from gross
income "the full amount of monthly payments received in settlement of a
damage suit[,]" rather than the "discounted present value" of those
payments. 194 Additionally, Revenue Ruling 79-313 allowed a plaintiff to
exclude from gross income the future periodic payments
regardless of
95
whether the payments increased on an annual basis.'
3. Thanks, Congress: The Exponential Increase in the Use of
Structured Settlements
Although structured settlements were used more frequently after the
1979 rulings, defendants were still unable to take full advantage of the
tax exemptions. 196 As a result, when a defendant purchased an annuity to
fund the periodic payments, the payments could only be deducted "as
business expenses as the money was distributed to the plaintiffs.' 9 7
Senator Baucus advocated for the expansion of the application of tax

incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.").
186. Risk, supra note 81, at 870.
187. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(1) (2006) ("[G]ross income does not include ... amounts received
under workmen's compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness.").
188. Babener, supranote 63, at 21.
189. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) ("[G]ross income does not include.., the amount of any damages
(other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or
as periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.").
190. Babener, supranote 63, at 21.
191. Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74.
192. Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75.
193. Id.; Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74; Babener, supranote 63, at 21.
194. Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74.
195. Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75.
196. See Babener, supra note 63, at 22.
197. Id.
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benefits to all payments set aside for structured settlements. 198 He
reasoned that structured settlements needed further protection because
they have become the norm due to the "obvious advantages" over lumpsum payments. 199 Senator Baucus proved to be successful. In 1983,
Congress passed the Periodic Payment Settlement Tax Act of 1982,20
which codified the two 1979 revenue rulings by amending Section
104(a)(2) and adding Section 130 to the I.R.C., which is still in effect
today.20' As a result, all money set aside for structured settlements,
taxable income under
including future payments, is not considered
20 2
I.R.C.
the
of
(a)(2)
and
Section 104(a)(1)
Congressional efforts successfully generated growth in the
structured settlement industry. 203 In 1976, the structured settlement
market's net worth was approximately $5 million. 204 By the early 1990s,
structured settlement annuity sales had grown to approximately
$4 billion.20 5 As of 2002, more than $6 billion were being paid out
annually to fund the purchase of annuity contracts.20 6
Unfortunately, Congress's attempt to protect the financial interests
of tort victims spawned the growth of the factoring industry. 0 7 By 2005,
an estimated $250 million of structured settlements were being sold to
factoring companies on an annual basis. 20 8 Today, a number of factoring
companies compete for over $5 billion in structured settlement awards
paid on an annual basis. 20 9 As long as structured settlements remain in
force, the factoring industry will continue to grow.210
The continued growth of the factoring market is evidence that the
tax rules were not as detrimental to the factoring industry as Congress
had hoped. For instance, although Section 5891 seeks to impose a tax on
198. 127 CONG. REc. 30,462 (1981) (statement of Sen. Baucus). U.S. Representative Daniel
Rostenkowski, chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, also submitted a report supporting
the position that "any amount received for agreeing to undertake an assignment of a liability to make
periodic payments as personal injury damages is not included in gross income." H.R. REP. No. 97832, at 4 (1982).
199. 127 CONG. REc. 30,462.
200. Periodic Payment Settlement Tax Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
201. Id. § 101, 96 Stat. at 2605-06; H.R. REP. No. 97-832, at 1; Babener, supra note 63, at 23.
202. I.R.C. § 104(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
203.
204.

Babener, supra note 63, at 18; Andrada, supranote 29, at 467.
Babener, supra note 63, at 18.

205. Id. at 19.
206. Id. at 7 & n.15.
207.

208.
209.
210.
position

See Koenig, supra note 28, at 813-14.

Babener, supra note 63, at 33.
Mannix, supranote 1, at 62.
Koenig, supra note 28, at 813-14 (recognizing that the factoring industry is in a great
to sustain future growth in an "ever-growing" structured settlement market).
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factoring companies, it does not stop the factoring companies from
charging excessive discount rates in order to make up for the tax. 21' In
fact, the factoring market is so strong that it emerged nearly unscathed
from the economic crisis in 2008.212 Although the economic crisis has
caused the price of factoring transactions to go up, the economic turmoil
caused a direct increase in consumer demand.21 3 Unfortunately, the
federal government's efforts have been insufficient. Currently,
approximately $100 billion in structured settlements are in full force
today, and factoring companies have shown that they will relentlessly
buy as many structured settlements as possible.21 4
C. New York State Legislature to the Rescue:
The Enactment of the N.Y SSPA
State legislators recognized a need to address the social problems
caused by an unregulated factoring industry. In September 2000, the
National Structured Settlement Trade Association (the "NSSTA") and
National Association of Settlement Purchasers drafted the Model
Structured Settlement Protection Act (the "Model SSPA"). 2 5 The Model
SSPA's main requirement is judicial approval of the transaction as a
precondition to the sale of a structured settlement recipient's rights to a
third party. 216 The NSSTA believed that the best way to regulate the
market would be through court supervision. 21 7 At least thirty-five states
have passed some sort of structured settlement protection statute based
on the Model SSPA.218
The Legislature's concern regarding the growth of the structured
settlement industry precipitated the passage of New York's structured
211. See I.R.C. § 5891(a) (2006); Mannix, supranote 1, at 62.
212. Babener, supranote 63, at 7.
213. Id.at 7 n.17, 34.
214. Hindcrt & Ulman, supra note 28, at 19 (estimating that more than $6 billion is paid out to
structured settlements recipients on an annual basis); see also Babener, supra note 63, at 33
("Currently, it is estimated that approximately 8,000 factoring transactions occur annually, with an
average price of $45,000, amounting to $360 million.").
215. MODEL STATE STRUCTURED SET"ILEMENT PROT. ACT §§ 1-7 (Language Agreed to by
National Structured Settlements Trade Association and National Association of Settlement
Purchasers 2000), available at http://www.ncoil.org/Docs/2011/StructuredSettlementsModel.pdf
(last visited Apr. 20, 2012); see also Hindert & Ulman, supranote 28, at 20, 28 n.4.
216.

See MODEL ST. STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT PROT. ACT § 4; Hindert & Ulman, supra note

28, at 20.
217. See MODEL ST. STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT PROT. ACT § 4; Hindert & Ulman, supra note
28, at 20 ("The effectiveness of any transfer of structured settlement payment rights is conditioned
on advance court approval of the transfer ....
").
218. Hindert & Ulman, supra note 28, at 20; see, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10136(a)-(b) (West
2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231C, § 2(a) (West Supp. 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3104
(2004); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1706 (McKinney 2010).
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settlement laws.2 19 Recently, New York passed its own structured
settlement protection act to safeguard its citizens against the factoring
industry. 220 As of July 1, 2002, the Legislature stated that all factoring
transactions must meet the conditions set forth in the N.Y. SSPA in
order to effectuate the factoring sale.221 The legislation's main purpose is
to protect2 and maintain the legitimacy of structured settlements for tort
22
victims.
The Legislature contended that the policy concerns surrounding the
sale of structured settlement recipients' payments at such sharply
discounted prices poses a serious threat to many, including new and old
claimants, taxpayers, and the government (which funds the assistance
programs that payees are forced to rely on once their future income has
been sold).223 The Legislature was concerned with the aggressive
advertisements (which create the allure of easy money, high discount
rates used by factoring companies), and the premature dissipation of
structured settlement funds tailored to the victim's needs.224 Moreover,
the Legislature understood that factoring companies, when left
unregulated, gained at the expense of a victim deprived of long-term
financial security.225

Accordingly, the Legislature enacted legislation to limit the
exploitive practices of the factoring industry.226 The N.Y. SSPA's main
requirement is prior court approval, which is intended to limit the
premature dissipation of structured settlement funds with those largely
unfamiliar with handling large amounts of money. 227 The Legislature
believed that N.Y. courts228would put a halt to the "victimization so
prevalent in the industry.
219. Memorandum of Assemblyman Mark Weprin, reprintedin 2002 LEGIS. ANN. 304, 304-05
(N.Y. 2002).
220. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1701 to 5-1709; Memorandum of Assemblyman Mark
Weprin, reprintedin 2002 LEGIS. ANN., at 304-05.
221. 2002 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1336-41 (McKinney). Effective January 1, 2011, the Legislature
amended Section 5-1705, now requiring an order to show cause, a statement explaining any
previous transfers or application for transfers, and that the payee attends the hearing transfer unless
excused for good cause. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1705(a), (d)(iv)-(e) (McKinney, Westlaw
through 2011 legislation).
222. Memorandum of Assemblyman Mark Weprin, reprintedin 2002 LEGIS. ANN., at 304.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1701 to 5-1709 (McKinney 2010 & Westlaw);
Memorandum of Assemblyman Mark Weprin, reprintedin 2002 LEGIS. ANN., at 304-05.
227. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1706(a)-(b); Memorandum of Assemblyman Mark
Weprin, reprintedin 2002 LEGIs. ANN., at 304-05.
228. 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. v. Martinez (In re 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P.),
816 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
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D. PreliminaryHurdles Plaintiffs Face When Entering into a
FactoringTransaction in New York
A claimant must pass a few preliminary hurdles before he or she
can sell his or her future income to a factoring company. 229 For example,
Section 5-1706(c) of the N.Y. SSPA requires that the factoring company
advise the payee, in writing, to seek independent counsel regarding the
transfer. 230 Additional procedural requirements are laid out in Sections 51703 and 5-1705.231 Specifically, Section 5-1705(d) requires: "(i) a copy
of the transfer agreement; (ii) a copy of the disclosure statement and
proof of notice of that statement required under Section 5-1703 of this
title; and (iii) a listing of each of the payee's dependents, together with
dependent's age., 232 Section 5-1703 explains that the disclosure
statement must set out, among other things, conspicuously in writing:
(1) "due dates of the structured settlement payments to be
transferred";
(2) "the aggregate amount of [the] payments";
(3) "the discounted present value of the [future] payments";
(4) a price quote which reflects the cost of purchasing a
comparable annuity for that amount;
(5) "the gross advance amount and the annual discount rate,
compounded" on a monthly basis;
(6) a list "of all commissions, fees, costs, expenses, and charges
payable by the payee"; the net amount to be received by the
payee;
(7) "any penalties or liquidated damages payable by the payee in
the event of any breach of the transfer agreement"; and
(8) "a statement that the payee has the right to cancel the transfer
agreement," which must be done by the third business day
after the payee signs the agreement.

229. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1706. Although most structured settlement contracts
contain an anti-assignment clause, the restrictive language of an anti-assignment clause is typically
not upheld in New York. See In re Settlement Funding of N.Y., L.L.C. (Platt), 774 N.Y.S.2d 635,
640 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (clarifying that if the parties meet all the requirements under the N.Y. SSPA, a
claimant may assign his or her structured settlement contract to a third party).
230. N.Y. GEN. OBLtG. LAW § 5-1706(c).
231. Id. §§ 5-1703, 5-1705.
232. Id. § 5-1705(d).
233. Id. § 5-1703. The discounted present value for the purpose of this statute means, "the
calculation of current value of the transferred structured settlement payments under federal
standards for valuing annuities, and the amount of the applicable federal rate used in calculating
such discounted present value." Id. § 5-1703(c) (internal quotation marks omitted). The net advance
amount means, "[tihe net cash payment you receive in this transaction from the
buyer... determined by applying the specific discount rate to the amount of future payments
received by the buyer, less the total amount of commissions, fees, costs, and expenses and charges
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Arguably, many of the procedural requirements set forth under the
N.Y. SSPA are very difficult to understand and thus provide a reason
why court supervision is necessary. Unless the petitioner truly
understands the complex financial terms set forth in the disclosure
statement, then the disclosure requirement does not help the claimant
further understand the transaction. For instance, the statute requires that
the present value and annual discount rate be clearly stated. 34 However,
the concepts of present value of money and discount rates are typically
foreign terms to the average recipient.23 5 Unfortunately, an
understanding of the present value of a recipient's future income, mainly
how much money is worth today in relation to the future, is the very
236
foundation of the factoring transaction.
E. The Courts' New Role
Since the passage of the N.Y. SSPA, the Legislature has forced
237
N.Y. judges to rule on a high number of factoring transactions. Prior
to the passage of the N.Y. SSPA, N.Y. courts were not involved in the
factoring process. 238 However, Section 5-1706(b) created a new role for
N.Y. courts: determining the "best interest" of settlement recipients. 39
Section 5-1706(b) mandates that the court must ensure that the
transaction is truly in the "best interest" of the payee, meaning the court
must consider the financial condition and needs of the applicant.240
Meanwhile a second inquiry is made to see whether the transaction is
"fair and reasonable" by looking at the overall market of loans,
prevailing interest rates, and alternative financing options, which means
that many times the two questions cannot be separated.24'
The best interest standard appears to be more lax than the standard
initially set forth when the statute was first adopted in 2002. Initially, the
payable." Id. § 5-1703(g) (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. Id.§ 5-1703(c), (e).
235. See Erickson, supra note 127, at 674 (explaining that the factoring transaction requires
"legal sophistication" to understand).
236. See Mannix, supra note 1, at 63.
237. See Memorandum of the Assembly Rules Committee, reprintedin 2004 LEGIS. ANN. 327,
328 (N.Y. 2004) (recognizing that prior to the passage of the N.Y. SSPA in 2002, claimants could
exchange their future payments for a lump sum without prior court approval).
238. See id.
239. The "best interest" criteria set out by the statute includes "the welfare and support of the
payee's dependants; and whether the transaction, including the discount rate used to determine the
gross advance amount and the fees and expenses used to determine the net advance amount, are fair
and reasonable." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1706(b) (footnote omitted).
240. Id.; In re 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. (DeMallie), 769 N.Y.S.2d 859, 861 (Sup. Ct.
2003).
241. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1706(b); DeMallie, 769 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
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best interest 42
determination included an "imminent financial hardship"
requirement. However, after deliberation, the Legislature removed the
"hardship" requirement.2 43 The Legislature no longer believes that a
showing of hardship is a necessary precondition to approval. 2 " Rather,
the Legislature believes that since the claimants are adults capable of
consent, they are in the best position to determine what is in their best
interest without proving hardship. 245 As a result, the transaction can be
approved without a court determination of hardship.246
F. The Major Problems with the N. Y. SSPA
Although the N.Y. SSPA remains a significant statute, the practical
effects of the statute on factoring transactions have not received much
attention. 247 For example, despite the requirement for prior court
approval, the approval rate for factoring transactions in the United States
is currently ninety-five percent or higher.248 Moreover, even when
denied, many applicants merely reapply for a transfer without a waiting
period.2 49 Although legislatures "did not intend for the courts to be mere
rubber stamps" on proposed factoring transactions, the numbers indicate
that courts across the country are approving these transactions at an
alarmingly high rate, and New York is no exception.250 Although a
review of the cases found on the legal research database Westlaw
suggests that most factoring transactions in New York are denied, 251 this
is not the case.252

242. Memorandum of the Assembly Rules Committee, reprinted in 2004 LEGIS. ANN., at 328
(internal quotation marks omitted).
243. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1706(b); Memorandum of the Assembly Rules Committee,
reprintedin 2004 LEGIs. ANN., at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted).
244. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1706(b).
245. Memorandum of the Assembly Rules Committee, reprintedin 2004 LEGIS. ANN., at 328.
246. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1706(b).
247. 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. v. Martinez (In re 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P.),
816 N.Y.S.2d 298, 298-99 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
248. Babener, supra note 63, at 40.
249. Id. at40-41.
250. In re Settlement Capital Corp. (Ballos), 769 N.Y.S.2d 817, 827 (Sup. Ct. 2003); Babener,
supra note 63, at 40.
251. As of February 22, 2012, Westlaw cites approximately one hundred New York cases that
reference the best interest standard and in nearly all the cases listed, the courts did not approve the
factoring transactions. See, e.g., Martinez, 816 N.Y.S.2d at 300, 302; In re 321 Henderson
Receivables, L.P. (DeMallie), 769 N.Y.S.2d 859, 862-63 (Sup. Ct. 2003); Ballos, 769 N.Y.S.2d at
829.
252. Many cases do not appear in a legal database. There is evidence that many factoring
transactions are approved but cannot be found on a legal database. See, e.g., supra notes 17-27 and
accompanying text (demonstrating that there was no record on Westlaw of the first three times the
court approved Whitney's transaction until an unpublished opinion was issued after her fourth
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Additionally, the best interest standard is not concrete enough to
create uniformity amongst the treatment of claimants, and thus courts
merely rubber stamp the cases with approval. 3 In New York, scant
interest has been devoted to actually creating a real standard for the best
interest test.254 Rather, different judges continue to scrutinize each

claimant's situation with a different focus. For instance, in In re 321
Henderson Receivables, L.P. (DeMallie),255 the court likened the best
interest test to the test applied in applications for the modification of
child support payments. 6 The court stated that unless the appellate
court establishes otherwise, structured settlement agreements are
presumed negotiated in the best interest of the payee and in order to
overcome this presumption, "there must be a showing, by clear and
convincing evidence, of an unforeseeable change in circumstances that
would justify the sale of rights to future payments. 257 The court
acknowledged that the standard could not be defined precisely.25 8 It held
that DeMallie's desire to trade in his future payments for cash to use
towards the purchase of a new home is not an unforeseeable change in
circumstances, and thus, his transaction was denied.2 59 However, since
there is no clear standard another court could have come out the other
way. For instance, in Charlotte Whitney's scenario, the courts must have
applied a different standard because she was approved for three different
factoring transactions within three years despite her lack of proof for a
concrete plan for the use of funds, and her track record of misusing the
funds that she received from the factoring transaction. 260 Thus, since the
Legislature has not yet devised a more precise rule, courts are likely to
continue to apply different standards to all future factoring transactions.
Additionally, although courts have ruled on hundreds of
applications since the passage of the N.Y. SSPA, there are no bright-line
rules for prohibitions against using high discount rates; thus, it appears
in many cases that "the transaction rates currently being used (along with
other factors) are inherently not fair and reasonable, nor in the payees'
best interests.,, 261 Factoring companies typically charge

structured

appearance before the court).
253.

Martinez, 816 N.Y.S.2d at 300; see supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.

254. Martinez, 816 N.Y.S.2d at 298-300.
255. 769 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
256. DeMallie, 769 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 862.
259. Id. at 863.
260. See Whitney v. LM Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3375/2011, 2011 WL 2654028, at *2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 24, 2011).
261. In re J.G. Wentworth Originations, L.L.C., No. 21636 2011, 2011 WL 6224568, at *4
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settlement payees a "punishingly high effective rate of interest., 262 When
the claimant seems to be in desperate need of cash, the money comes at a
steeper price, which translates into a steeper discount rate. 263 The
Legislature has not proposed any parameters as to whether factoring
transactions are "in fact, fair and reasonable. 264 Nevertheless, the court
will likely find that the discount rate is acceptable as long as it is "within
the range of the marketplace. 2 65 This is a major problem because the
range of rates charged may be as high as seventy-two percent. 266 Thus,
under the fair and reasonable test, a largely unregulated market governs
the range of rates acceptable in N.Y. courts. The question must be posed
in the best interest of the payee when the
then: how can a transaction be
267
rates are "punishingly high"?

Further, the high interest rates charged by factoring companies pose
a possible ethical dilemma. Attorneys have an ethical and fiduciary duty
to obtain a reasonable amount for their client; however, the rates
factoring companies charge certainly makes this nearly impossible.26 8
Another ethical dilemma posed by the N.Y. SSPA is that there is no
requirement that independent council must represent the payee when the
payee appears before the court.2 6 9 An attorney working for Wentworth,
for example, may very well represent the payee before the court. 270 The
N.Y. SSPA does not limit the number of times an applicant can appear
before the court regarding the factoring of his or her payments, nor is
there a waiting period. 271 Thus, if a claimant is denied on the first
payment, he or she can potentially reappear before the court to factor the
second, third, and even fourth payment.272

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 2011).
262.

DeMallie,769 N.Y.S.2d at 861.

263. Id.
264.
265.

In re J.G. Wentworth Originations,L.L.C., 2011 WL 6224568, at *4.
See In re 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. (Lemanski), 819 N.Y.S.2d 826, 832 (Sup. Ct.

2006).
266. Corboy, supranote 1, at 116.
267. DeMallie, 769 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
268. See Corboy, supranote 1, at 116.
269. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1706(c) (McKinney 2010) (indicating that the applicant
must be advised in writing to seek independent professional advice and has received that advice or

knowingly has waived such advice).
270. See id.
271. Seeid. §§ 5-1701 to 5-1709.

272. See id. (failing to state in the statutory language that anything prevents a claimant from
appearing in court in an attempt to factor his or her payment(s), even if he or she fails on a prior
attempt).
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V.

FIxING THE N.Y. SSPA: PROPOSALS

The Legislature should provide clearer guidelines for the judges to
follow in order to better effectuate the N.Y. SSPA. Section A provides
four legislative solutions to resolve the problems with the N.Y. SSPA.
Meanwhile, Section B provides feasible approaches that plaintiffs can
utilize to better equip themselves against the false sense of security that
factoring transactions provide.
A.

NecessaryLegislative Action

The N.Y. SSPA, when applied, does little to protect claimants.
Rather, structured settlement recipients are left at the mercy of the
factoring industry because the standards that courts are instructed to
follow are not clearly defined.2 73 As a result, since courts have been
unable to achieve a clear standard, the Legislature should revise the
statute to create a more uniform standard in New York so that the initial
intent of protecting payees from aggressive factoring can truly be
effectuated.
Critics have suggested that the factoring industry should be
banned.274 These critics have often compared structured settlements and
the factoring industry to The Odyssey's Ulysses who bound himself to
the mast of his ship to prevent from swimming towards the Sirens'
deadly shores.275 One author even noted that "[t]he difference between
Ulysses and the plaintiff in the structured settlement is that, so far as we
know, Ulysses did not get a tax break to encourage being bound." 276 The
key difference between the factoring industry and Ulysses, however, is
that Ulysses could not simply untie himself for a small price.2 77 Despite
public policy concerns, banning the factoring industry is not justified.
Since the recipient's future is unpredictable, the liquidity that factoring
companies provide is valuable.278
The Legislature should not ban the factoring industry. Rather, the
Legislature should revise the N.Y. SSPA in order to better regulate the

273. See supra Part IV.F.
274. Senator Warns on Selling StructuredSettlement Payments, supra note 53.
275. Babener, supra note 63, at 41; Henry E. Smith, Essay, Structured Settlements as
Structures of Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 1953, 1969-70 (2002).
276. Smith, supra note 275, at 1970.
277. Babener, supra note 63, at 42.
278. Id. In 1995, Douglas Winsor, jobless and hard-pressed for cash, sought the help of
Wentworth after watching Wentworth's "cash now" ads on television. O'Connell, supra note 124, at
A1. He turned his $106,385.50 into $31,711 in order to catch up on his late mortgage payments. Id.
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factoring industry and limit the number of factoring transactions. There
are four main revisions that the Legislature should make.
First, a maximum discount rate should be introduced so that
factoring companies cannot charge steep discount rates on non-risky
' 28
assets.2 79 These rates are surprisingly high for a "secured investment. 0
Even credit cards, which are unsecured assets, do not charge nearly as
much as some factoring companies.28' If credit card companies do not
charge excessively high rates for unsecured assets,282 why should
factoring companies be able to do so for secured assets?
Comparatively, the Legislature has effectively created a similar
limitation on the discount rate with respect to the assignment of lottery
281
winnings. 28
Pursuant to the N.Y. Tax Law, a court will allow for the
assignment if the court finds that "[t]he purchase price being paid for the
payments being assigned represents a present value of the payments
being assigned, discounted at an annual rate that does not exceed ten
percentage points over the Wall Street Journal prime rate. 284 The
Legislature should apply a similar provision under the N.Y. SSPA given
the following factors:
(1) the unequal bargaining power of these payees as compared to the
transferees is palpable; (2) it appears that persons in financial distress
may be disproportionately targeted by transferees simply because of
their financial position, thereby forcing the former to accept pennies on
the dollar on AAA-rated annuities; and (3) there is little, if any, risk on
the part of transferees yet payees nevertheless
receive a small portion
' 285
of what their annuities are presently worth."

279. See In re 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. (DeMallie), 769 N.Y.S.2d 859, 861 (Sup. Ct.
2003) ("[Structured settlement payments are] as secure as any commercial instrument can possibly
be, and there is no obvious justification for treating it as equivalent to a consumer's unsecured
promise to keep a revolving credit account current."). A trial court judge has asked that the
Legislature consider adding a cap discount rate to the N.Y. SSPA. Peter Vodola, New York Judge
Rejects Structured Settlement Factoring Transaction, Calls for Legislature to Consider Rate Cap,
SECONDARY INS. MARKET BLoG (Dec. 28, 2011, 11:59 PM), http://www.secondaryinsurancemarket
blog.com/weblog/2011/12/new-york-judge-rejects-structured-settlement-factoring-transaction-callsfor-legislature-to-consider.html.
280. DeMallie, 769 N.Y.S.2d at 861 (finding that eighteen percent is a very high rate for a
"secured investment").
281. See, e.g., Corboy, supranote 1, at 116 (noting factoring company rates as high as seventytwo percent); White, supra note 139, at 449, 467 (noting that the interest rate limit for banks in
Minnesota to be no higher than eighteen percent per year).
282. See White, supranote 139, at 449, 467.
283. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1613(d)(l)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 2011).
284. Id. (specifying that the rate applied would be the one "published on the business day prior
to the date of execution of the contract").
285. Vodola, supranote 279.
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Thus, it would be appropriate for the Legislature to create a similar
discount rate scheme.
Second, claimants should not be allowed to sell their structured
settlements to any factoring company within a small time frame.286 A
maximum ratio should be set to make sure that only a portion of the
structured settlement is sold to a factoring company over the course of
the victim's lifetime. 87 Since every factoring transaction differs on a
case-by-case basis, the statute should not adopt a standard percentage.'"
Rather, a maximum ratio, which incorporates how much of the
structured settlement a claimant has left and the present value of the
future payments, would make more sense. 289
For instance, if a maximum ratio were set at fifty percent, once that
ratio is met, a claimant would be precluded from appearing before the
court to sell off the remaining payments.290 In support of this
proposition, when the applicant argues that he or she is in dire need of
immediate cash in order to avoid a situation such as foreclosure, once the
claimant receives the cash, the problem should be resolved.2 9 1 However,
because there is no maximum ratio, claimants are not using the funds for
their intended purpose and are appearing before the courts numerous
292
times and selling off, one by one, their entire future income stream.
The maximum ratio approach would be judicially efficient and force the
claimant to be cognizant of the fact that he or she must make better use
of the cash received from previous factoring transactions, otherwise the
claimant will have to wait for the future payment to mature. 293 Thus, the
combination of a maximum ratio and a maximum discount rate will

286. But cf supra text accompanying notes 17-27 (demonstrating that the court allowed
Whitney to sell half of the payments due to her for the next sixty-six years within three years).
287. A maximum ratio would ensure that Whitney could not sell half of her payments within a
mere three years. See supratext accompanying notes 17-27.
288. Compare supra text accompanying notes 1-16 (discussing how White factored away so
many payments that he eventually required public assistance), with supra text accompanying notes
17-27 (discussing how Whitney factored away half of her guaranteed payments, while failing to
provide the court with different reasons for the multiple factoring transactions).
289. Cf supra text accompanying notes 1-27 (noting that without a maximum ratio, claimants
can factor away an exorbitant portion of their structured settlement).
290. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 17-27 (demonstrating that since Whitney sold
half of her payments, the maximum ratio would be met, and she would be precluded from selling off
the rest of her payments).
291. See O'Connell, supra note 124, at Al (explaining that Winsor received cash for his future
payments and used the money to pay off his mortgage as intended).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 17-27.
293. But cf supra text accompanying notes 17-27 (demonstrating that without a maximum
ratio, Whitney was free to use the funds however she desired and did not need to wait for future
payments to mature if she wanted more money).
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ensure that the sharp discount rates, which legislators and
attorneys
2 94
general have referenced as being "usurious," will be avoided.
Third, the Legislature should amend the N.Y. SSPA prohibiting
factoring companies and any of its affiliates from providing advice
regarding the transfer. A major issue the N.Y. SSPA fails to sufficiently
address is the issue of representation. 95 Currently, the N.Y. SSPA does
not require the payee to actually speak to an independently qualified
professional.29 6 Rather, the factoring company merely has to advise the
transferee to seek independent professional advice and the payee has the
option to "knowingly" waive such advice in writing. 297 A situation may
arise where the payee may very well consult an attorney affiliated with
the factoring company and waive the independent advice requirement.
Hence, a provision should be added to explicitly bar the payee from
receiving legal advice from factoring companies and their affiliates.298
Moreover, in order to give this proposed provision more bite, the
provision should require written proof that the payee has sought truly
independent advice and understands the consequences and alternatives of
factoring transactions. 299 A viable solution would be to allow law
students to represent the payees free of charge through law school clinic
programs. 300 Thus, a requirement that claimants actually speak to
independent professionals, particularly attorneys who will ensure that
factoring companies are truly independent of the transaction, ensures that
the payees are not lured into transactions through a false sense of
security.30'

294. See Mannix, supranote 1, at 62.
295. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1706(c) (McKinney 2010).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. A victim that falls for the allure of a factoring company's advertisements, such as Bobbie
Jean Sweeney, is not likely to speak to independent counsel and knowingly waive her rights. See
O'Connell, supra note 124, at A8 (discussing how Sweeney fell for a factoring company
advertisement that left her unable to make ends meet but never sought help beyond calling the
factoring company itself).
299. Cf. Marmix, supra note 1, at 62 (recognizing that many of the applicants are vulnerable
individuals who do not truly understand the value of their payments).
300. Cf. Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable Response
to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67
FoRDHAM L. REv. 1879, 1903-04 (1999) (explaining that the University of Maryland law school
clinics initially staffed the Pro Se Divorce Project and helped clients by explaining legal issues the
clients were facing, subsequently making the program into a success).
301. See Memorandum of Assemblyman Mark Weprin, reprinted in 2002 LEGIS. ANN. 304,
304 (N.Y. 2002) (stating that factoring companies use advertisements and promises of instant cash to
lure payees into selling off their settlements); see also Mannix, supra note 1, at 62 (providing a
reminder that the public policy behind structured settlements is to "prevent accident victims from
frittering away large sums intended to provide for them over their lifetimes").
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Fourth, the statute should adopt a preclusive subsection. For
instance, under the N.Y. SSPA, a claimant can try to sell the same
payment without any limits as to the number of times he or she can
appear before the court.3 °2 Further, there are no limits to the number of
times a plaintiff can be denied the sale of a future payment. °3 Since
nothing in the N.Y. SSPA stops recipients from renewing a petition for
transfer until the payment is actually paid out, a petitioner initially
denied benefits could return days later to seek approval.0 4
Effective January 1, 2011, New York enacted a few amendments
that address but do not completely resolve the preclusion issues on a
factoring transaction already denied by a N.Y. court.3 °5 The enactment of
the New York proposals demonstrates that the Legislature recognized
that there were problems associated with the N.Y. SSPA.30 6 However,
the recent amendments are not enough. For instance, under the
amendment, the petitioner must include "a statement setting forth
whether there have been any previous transfers or applications for
transfer of the structured settlement payment rights and giving details of
all such transfers or applications for transfer., 30 7 Although this proposal
does not rise to the level of claim preclusion, it would allow the court to
take into account the number of times a petitioner has filed for court
approval on any given future payment.30 8 This is also important because
prior to this amendment, N.Y. courts had no record of prior transfers.30 9
A payee could bring forth a petition for the last of his or her payments,
after having transferred all but one of his or her future payments, and the
judge would be unaware that this was the last of the recipient's
payments. 3 Additionally, prior to this amendment, the petitioner could
302. See, e.g., In re 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. (Lemanski), 819 N.Y.S.2d 826, 827-28
(Sup. Ct. 2006) (explaining that Lemanski was denied on June 8, 2006, yet on July 13, 2006, he
reappeared before the court to reargue that the very same payments that were initially denied by the
courts should be approved for transfer).
303. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1701 to 5-1709 (McKinney 2010).
304. See id; Babener, supra note 63, at 40-41.
305. The Legislature has made an effort to ensure that a claimant does not take advantage of
the lack of a preclusive effect on a denied claim. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1705(a), (d)(iv), (e)
(McKinney, Westlaw through 2011 legislation).
306. These amendments, when taken as a whole, were intended to better safeguard the payee.
New Consumer Protections Take Effect with New York's Structured Settlement Protection Act,
NAT'L STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS TRADE ASS'N (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.nssta.com/content/

new-consumer-protections-take-effect-new-york's-structured-settement-prtetin-at.
307. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1705(d)(iv) (Westlaw).
308. See id.
309. New Consumer Protections Take Effect with New York's StructuredSettlement Protection
Act, supra note 306.
310. See id.
According to Peter Vodola of the NSSTA Legal Committee:
Courts have repeatedly said that they should be made aware of prior transfers and also
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have been denied in another state without the court ever knowing that the
transaction was denied by another court. a1
Moreover, the federal government should step in to ensure that
there is uniformity in structured settlement protection acts in the United
States. For instance, there are a few states that do not have a structured
settlement protection act in place, and even fewer states have one that
requires the court to receive information about prior transfers.3" 2 Thus,
the lack of uniformity undercuts the progress that many states have made
because a claimant who is denied a transfer in New York could travel to
one of those non-protectionist states and likely get the factoring
transaction approved.
B.

What Else Can Be Done? More FeasibleApproaches

Structured settlement recipients must become more educated on the
available alternatives to the factoring industry. American International
Group ("AIG") conducted its own study on structured settlements and
found that that fifty-seven percent of structured settlement recipients
who chose lump-sum payments squandered the entire settlement
prematurely.31 3 Although the study does not indicate how long the
recipients took to deplete their settlements, the study nevertheless
demonstrates the need to educate Americans on structured settlements.
AIG contends that "[w]ithout awareness, the majority of those impacted
by personal injury or accidental death cases run the risk of making
ill3 14
health.
financial
long-term
jeopardize
may
that
informed choices

about unsuccessful transfer attempts-and that they may need these details to make
informed judicial decisions. Judges say that the information about such factoring
attempts can impact the issue of the payee's best interests, and can be critically

important, especially if a judge denied a transfer for some reason that continues to be
relevant. The New York SSPA now spells it out that factoring companies must provide

judges with that prior transfer information.
Id.
311. See id.
312. See Hindert & Ulman, supra note 28, at 20; Peter Vodola, New York Amends Structured
Settlement Protection Act So That Courts Get More Information About Prior Transfers,
SECONDARY INS. MARKET BLOG (Oct. 11, 2010, 5:16 AM), http://www.secondaryinsurancemarket

blog.com/weblog/2010/10/new-york-amends-structured-settlemetn-protection-act-so-that-courtsget-more-information-about-prior.html. New York is now the second state to include in its
structured settlement protection act a requirement that the court making a determination on the
factoring transaction receive information about any prior transfers. Vodola, supra.
313. AM. INT'L GRP., STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS SURVEY REPORT (2008), available at
https://www.aigag.com/life/life.nsf/Lokup/AIGSSsurvey-press/$file/AIGSSsurveyreport.pdf.
314. Id. Many Wentworth customers claim that they might have realized the repercussions of
their transactions had they understood the long-term effects of factoring transactions. Mannix, supra
note 1, at 64.
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Taking into account the structured settlement recipient's lack of
financial sophistication, if claimants were more educated on factoring
transactions and alternatives available to them, they would be less likely
to fall prey to factoring transactions. 315 For instance, investment
alternatives, such as trusts, are vehicles that could help the plaintiff
better manage his or her money. 33166 A trust is very similar to a structured
settlement, except that the defendant gives the funds to a trustee,
3 7
typically a bank, to hold for the beneficiary, who is the tort victim. 1
The trustee then makes the investment decisions by investing those
funds in the trust. 318 Subsequently, payments are made in accordance
with the trust agreement. 319 Trusts can prove to be quite flexible because
the terms of the payments frequently vary. 320 Moreover, the trust
payments can be designed at the outset to allow the tort victim to access
the funds as necessary, but it is dependent upon the victim's
predisposition to dissipate funds prematurely. 321 Thus, those who
understand how a trust works may very well benefit from the flexibility
and protection that a trust provides.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Legislature should revise the N.Y. SSPA in order to better
safeguard the rights of structured settlement recipients from the
destructive practices of the factoring industry. A structured settlement is
a better option over lump-sum payments because it offers a claimant
322
many advantages over lump-sum payments.2
These benefits include tax
breaks, spendthrift protection, a guaranteed source of income, and
lifetime financial support. 323 Further, the guaranteed source of income

greatly diminishes the risk that a claimant will become a burden to
society and depend on the government for assistance.324 Disability
advocates, economists, and many others all share the belief that
structured settlements provide victims with "model benefit[s] .,325

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

See AM. INT'L GRP., supranote 313.
Andrada, supranote 29, at 494-95.
Id. at495.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part I.C.
Carson & Tong, supranote 79, at 313.
See Babener, supra note 63, at 8.
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However, factoring transactions inhibit a claimant's ability to fully
realize these advantages. 326 For instance, the factoring transaction
transfers to the factoring company a claimant's guaranteed source of
income and lifetime financial support for a steep price.327 Thus, factoring
practices undermine the legislative intent of protecting structured
settlement recipients from prematurely dissipating their structured
settlements.328
Unfortunately, the N.Y. SSPA does little to limit the high rates
charged by factoring companies. 329 The Legislature should do more to
ensure that unsophisticated claimants are not charged excessively high
rates-which, if charged by the loan industry, would be unacceptable.33 °
Thus, a maximum discount rate and maximum ratio should be adopted in
order to minimize the exploitation of claimants, a provision should be
included in the N.Y. SSPA that clearly states that factoring companies
cannot represent payees in court, and claimants should not be allowed to
sell their structured settlement payments to any factoring company
within a specific time frame.331 Finally, educating claimants cannot be
overemphasized.332 Perhaps if claimants knew more about factoring
transactions, they would make wiser financial decisions regarding their
future payments.333 Thus, the adoption of these proposals by the
Legislature would be a significant step towards curing the modem day
Esau problem caused by the factoring industry.
Michelle M Marcellus*

326. See Corboy, supranote 1, at 116.
327. Id.
328. Mannix, supra note 1, at 62.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 261-67. "Despite the improvements to the New York
SSPA, NSSTA remains profoundly concerned about actions of companies outside the structured
settlement industry that encourage accident survivors to sell their future structure payment rights."
New Consumer Protections Take Effect with New York's Structured Settlement Protection Act,
supranote 306.
330. See Corboy, supra note 1, at 116.
331. See supra Part V.A.
332. See AM. INT'L GRP., supra note 313.
333. See id.
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